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BRIEF STATEMENT OF THEPOWER.
Courts exercise their power in running and building
railroads through orders, receivers, and receiver's certif-
icates. 4receiver is an indifferent person between the
parties to a cause, appointed by the court to receive and
preserve the property or fund in litigation(P6"&I "
pendente lite, when it does not seem reasonable to the
court that either party should hold it. (a) He is not
the agent(a. 4)or representative of either party to
the action, but is uniformly regarded as an officer of the
court, exercising his function in the interest of neither
plaintiff nor defendant (vw), but for the common benefit
of all parties in interest. (b) Being an officter of the
court, the fund or property entrusted to his care is regarded
as being in custodia legis,for the benefit of whoever
may eventuallystablish title thereto, the court itself
having the care of the property by its receiver, who is
merely its creature or officter, having no power other
than those conferreA upon him by the order of his appoint-
ment, or such as are derived from the established prac-
ti4Qe of courts of equity. (c)
ir1
(4Booth v. Clark 17 How. on #331.
(b)Baker v. Adm. of Backus 32111.79.
(c)High on Receivers # I. and cases cited.
A receiver's certificate may be defined as a non-
negotialle evidence of debt, or debenture,issued by author-
ity of a courtof equity, as a :irst lien upon the property
of a debtor corporation in the hands of a receiver. (a)
The receiver can only issue such certificates as he is
authorized toC4 by the court. If he goes beyond that,
and issues certificates bearing false and fraudulent rep-
resentations upon their face, and places them upon the
market for sale, he will be held personally liable to any
bona fide holder of such certificates, although the re-
ceiver had no purpose to defraud or deceive such holder
when he executed the certificates. The certificates 6
must be disposed ofin a manner and for a purpose authorized
by the order of the court under which they are issued, or
they are generally held invalid and of no effect as against
the trust estate in the hands of the court. To illustrate:
Where receivers of a railroad were authorized to issue cer-
tificates to a certain amount, which were made a first
lien upon the road, ..d the i .... . ... order
to raise funds to repair it, and the receivers issued
some of these certificates to a person for an entirely
(a) Beach in 3 Law Quarterly Magazine 429.
different purpose, and did not rIeceive ank mony or loan
for the same, such certificates were '.eld to be ilzvalid
and of no e fect in the hand-, of a bona fide holder for
value. (a) '-early every quality essenit , to the rieotia-
bility of conmercial p' per is, wanting in such certificates.
They bind no one personally, nor can any action be main-
tained on them against any one. iLot having the- qualities
of negotia le paper they are not assignable so as to bar
the equities existing against the payees to whom they are
issued. (b)
Courts of equity derive their power to appoint re-
ceivers and take property into their custody on account
of their extraordinary jurisdiction in supplying "de.fects
in the law." (c)
The power is justly regarded as one of a ver : high
nature, and not to be exercised where it world be pro-
ductive of serious injustice or injury to private rights.
It is a re-empuory measure, whose effect, temporarily at
least, is to deprive of his property a defendant in pos-
session, bejVore a final jr e t or decree is reached by
the court determining tihe rights of tie perties° And
(a)Receivers of Corporations (Gluck 1 ecker) page 441.
Stanton v. Ala. & Chattanoo&, R. R. Co. F1 ed. FKep,, cS.4.S,.
(b)Union Trust Co. v.Illinois Ididland R. -P. 0.
117 U. S.A7S4, 456, 460.
(c)Turner v. I. B. & ,. F. Co. 8 Lissell (rS. . C.C.)2s15
!,acon , ,est rn P. R. v. Parker *a.S32.
F"suiok V. S a11l 9Q U. S. 25 .
4since it is a serious interference with the rights of the
citizcn, withot the verdict of a jury and before a regular
hearing, it should only be granted for the prevention of
manifest wrong and injury. (a)
The power exercised by courts of equity in the ap-
pointment of receivers is invoked upon many occasions
with great advantage to the parties. It is especially
beneficial when there is danger that the subject matter in
controversy may be wasted, destroyed, injured or rented
during the progress of the litigation; the object of tiie
relief being to secure the fund for the person who may
ultimately be found entitled thereto, with as little pre-
judice as possible to any of those concerned. (b)
The principal grounds upon which courts of equity
grant their extraordinary aid by the appointment of re-
ceivers pendente lite,are that the person seeking the re-
lief has shown at least a probable interest in the property,
and that there is danger of its being ]ost unless a receiver
As allowed; the element of danger being an important con-
s
sideration in the case. (c)
(a)Crawford v. Ross 39 G a.44. Baker v. Adm. 32 Ill.79.
(b)Mercantile Trust Co. v.R. R. Co. 41 Fed. Rep.8.
High on Receivers #4 and c' ses cited.
Jones on R. R. Securities 5o7.
(c)l igh on Receivers -' II.
5The powers and duties of a receiver are defined and
limited in the order of the coutt appointing him. A
railroad rarely gets into the hands of a court of equity
until it is insolvent and there is a struggle among the
creditors for the settlement of their clai,is. Therefore,
until such a state of affairs comes about, a court of
equity haIno powers whatever in runnimg and building
railroads. However, when a company receiving income more
than sufficient to pay the expenses of an economical man-
agement refuses to apply the surplus to the payment of a
judgment or mortgage which is u. lien upon its property, a
receiver may be appointed. (a)
Since the railroad comes into a court of equity in-
solvent, and the creditors are striving to satisfy their
claims, the law as regards railways in such cases is an ^
of the law governingeneral cases of insolvency under the
same circumstances. Whenever banking, insurance and man-
ufacturing companies become insolvent and creditors start
litigation to secure payment of their claims, the method
employed is to stop the running of the business by in-
junction, appoint a receiver to preserve the property
(a) Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd
21 How. 112.
duriing the litig--,tion ,and stop all possible expense.
Then sell the proprirty to the I'is' rest bidder as ,.oon as the
litigation is ended. From the proceeds of the sale deduct
the cost oo perty and distribut ' the rest
to those fouind entitled to it. This has been found to be
the best method to pursue because it yields the largest
money return to all interested. (a)
The railroad corporation necessitated a different
procedure because it would deteriorate in value if allowed
to stand unused (or ieven a day. Also it is of a quasi-
public character and has duties to peri'ornto the public
vich necessitates its being kept as a soing concern. (b)
It is fundamental in the law that a recivership is
temporary---to serve an existing exigency of a temporary
nature, and "111-len that is done, it is to cease. (c) Since
t'ie causes are complicated the roai may b- in the hands of[-)
a receiver several years, but it is there only so long
as is necessary to determine the rights of those inter-
ested,
Courts of equity are reluctant to apm oint receivers
over a railway and will only do so under the pressure
of an absolutenecessity. (d)
(a)Barton v. BL-rbour 104 U. S. on 135 and on.
Coalt.'-:v. Co. v.Central U. R. Co.-I .. J. EQ. IT 7z7 0.
(b)Gates v. L. 1-1 Y. A ir R. R. 33 Conn.",ZZ&, 12 - 3
(c]J--ude 1arrett in R. P. V. R, U. 30 Vt .571.
v2Jl. - .;L- . R. Co. v. Sott er 2 W all. 510.
7But in proper gases they will appoint a receiver to
take charge of the railroad, and give him power to prerve
manage and conduct thebusiness, and in doing this to
keep the line iIrepair. In extraordinary cases the courts
empower the receiver to buy rolling stock, build bridges,
and miles of road, and S)pay for it with receivers cer-
tificates which are a first lien on the income and corpus
of the entire railroad property.
For illustrative cases see:
Kennedy v. St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co.
2 Dillon (U. S. C. C.)448; s. c.5 Dillon.
Meyer v. Johnson 53 Ala. 237.
Wallace v. )oomis 97 U. S. 146.
Fosdick v. Schall 99 U. S. 235.
Miltenberger v.Logansport R. R. Co.106 U. S. 286.
Unton Trust Co. v.Illinois Midland R. R. II% U. S. 434.
Ver. & CaNaua R. R. Co. v. Vermont Central R. R. Co.
50 Vt. 500'.
"It is not unusual" said Mr. Justice swayne, "for
courts of equity to put receivers in charge of the rail-
roads of companies whiah have fallen into financial em-
barrassment, and to require them to operate such roads
until the difficulties are r1emoved, or such arrangements
areade that the roads can be sold, with the leasts-cri-
fice of the interests of those concerned. In all such
casesthe receiver is the right arm of the jurisdictiQon
invoked. As regards the statutes, we see no reason why
a court of equity, in the exercise of its undoubted author-
ity, may not accomplish all the best resumits intended to
be secured by such legislation without its aid." (a)
"The power of a court of equity to appoint managing )
receivers of such property as a railroad, when taken under
its charge as trust fuond for the payment of encumbrances,
and to authorize such receiver to raise money necessary
for the preservation and management of the property, and
make the same chargeable as a lien thereon for its re-
payment, cannot, at this day, be seriously disputed. It
is a part of that jurisdiction, always exercised by the
court, by which it is its duty to protect and preserve the
trust funds in its hands. It is undoubtedly a power to
be exercised with great caution; and, i; possible, with
the consent or acquiescence of the parties interested in
the fund." (b)
(a) Davis v. Gray 16 Wall. 203.
(b)Wallace v. loomis 97 U. S. 146, 162.
EXPLANATION TO RECONCILE CO1BLICTING CASES.
A court of equity derives its power to appoint man-
aging receivers of an insolvent railway and to order re-
pairs, etc. made---the expense of which is a first lien
on the railway prop ei'ty---from its extraordinary jurisdic-
tion which enables it to adapt its procedure to all cases
which arise and to cur: defects in Lhe law. (a) It is
absolutely impossible to enumerate all the special kinds
of relie _f which may 4_-e gramted, or to place any bounds
to the powder of the court in shaping the relief in accord-
ance with the circumstances of particular cases. As the
nature and incidents of proprietary rights and interests,
and of the circumstances attending them, are practically
unlimited, so are the kinds and forms of specific relief
applicable to these circumstances and relations. (b)
In many Of' the cases th.e mortgaged bondholders apply
for thereceiver and ask for the expenditure of the money
on the property. In such cases they wave their superior
lien by asking for the expenditure. There has been very
(a) Adley v. The Whitstable Co. 17 Vesey 315.
(b) I Pomeroy's Equitable Jurisprudence 153.
little litigation as to the priority of receiver's cer-
tificates as it is generally provided that they are a
first lien on the property in the judge's order author-
izing them. They are universally held to be prior to
liens of all parties who were within the jurisdiction of
the court.
The earlie, clses exten-ded the principle to insolvent
railways which allows the mortgagee to make necessary
expenditures for the preservation of his security and
charge the same to the property. This was their founda-
tion for making receiver's certificates a first lien on
the property. If this was the only ground upon which they
could be based the court could make no greater repairs or
extensions of the road than a mortgage_ e could do to pro-
tect and preserve his security. The courts have gone
farther than that.
The Supreme court of the United States, speaking
generally, has held that receiver'S certificates may be
lawfully authorized "to raise money necessary for the
proservati;n and management of the property."
"No limit has been fixed as to the purposes for which
receiver's certificates may be issued, other than that
they shall be germane to the objects of the receivership,
II
and necessary to the proper administration of the trust."(a)
In Galveston Railroad v. Cowdrey (II Wall. 459) it
was held that the pincle applicable in maritime cases
which gives priority of lien to the last creditor furn-
iLshing supplies and repairs for the conservation of the
ship or voyage, does not apply to railroads.
There was an attempt made to show that the court in
ordering liens to be made a charge on the property before
the first mortgage bonds were violating the obligation of
contracts and that the court did not have that power for
it was in conflict with a provision of the United States
Constitution. The point was held not to be well taken
and very little explanation was given by the courts. The
reason seems to be that parties cannot come into a court
of equity and receivoequitable relief without doing equity
to others interested in the same suit; that they cannot
ask equity for themselves and arbitrary legal rules for the
rest of the parties to the action.
From the peculiar characteristics of railroad mortgages
they are never foreclosed without the parties conceding
and receiving something besides their strict legal rights
(a) High on Receivers(f2d 4d.) #398.
and thus an equitable situation is developed and the
courts must deal with allparties as equitably as possible.
A court of equity will, in the exercise of its sound dis-
cfetion, take jurisdiction of an insolvent --ailroad
and appoint a receiver over it only in cases of great
urgoncy and when that is clearly the best relief for all
the parties interested, including the publicX 4wfter
the court acquires jurisdiction it has the power, in suit-
able cases, to run trains, repair, improve and extend
the road, and in doing so create first liens on the prop-
erty. This does not impair the obligation of contracts.
Just what the court can do depends on the circumstances of
each caee. No rule can be given to cover the facts of the
cases adjudicated and much less the cases that will arise.
The controlling considerations are the necessity for the
particular order of the court to protect interests of all
parties interested in the property including the public,
and the exercise of entire good faith. The extent of the
power ofthe court is mcasured by the equities of eacl case.
The power of a court of equity to rtu and repair
and build railroads and in doing this to authorize the
issue of receiver's certificates and to make them a first
lien on the property, payable before the first mortgaged
13
bonds, is not questioned in any of the cases in our State
or Federal reports. The expediency of exercising the
power is questioned but not the existence of the power. It haj
been expressly upheld in many leading cases. The courts
are in great confusion as to how far this power extends
and what should aall it into operation.
The courts of equity will not recede from the posi-
tion they have assumed in running and building railways,
nor will legislation take away their power in this regard,
the text-books to the contrary notwithstanding. They will
come nearer fulfilling Judge Brewer's prophecypage 0 C
This will come naturally when the legislatures reduce the
railroad charges so all the lines become insolvent and
get into equity. Then the equity judges will be educated
up to the point where they can see that by the equity
courts running all the railroads in the country justice
will be done to all the parties interested, and theh the
courts will adapt themselves to the new conditions and
have the necessary power.
The English courts of chancery declined to appoint
receivers to manage railroads on the ground that when
Parliament, acting for the public interest, authorized
the construction and maintenance of a railway, both as a
highway for the public, and as a road on which the com-
pany m-_qy themselves become carriers of passengers and
goods, it confers powers and imposes duties and responsi-
bilities of the largest and most iiportant kind, and it
confers and imposes them upon the company which Parlia-
ment has before it, and upon no other body of persons.(a)
The appointment of receivers of railways in Englamd is
now regulated by the Railway Companies Act of 1875, 38
39 Vic. ch. 31, making the act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vic.
ch. 127 perpetual. They provide for the appointment of
receivers of r ilways.
t
The courts of New York deied the claims of employees
to be paid ahead of the first mortgage bonds for services
rendered within six months before the receiver was appointed.
(b) But a statute was passed by the very next legisla-
ture maing it tho duty of the receiver to pay the wages
of the employees in preference to all other debts or claims,
and no distinction was made between wages earned before
and after the receiver was appointed. (c)
From the English and Neo7 York statutes, I draw the
conclusion that the decisioh in those places are erroneous
and that the courts there should have held the same as
(a)Gardiner v. London,Chatham,&Dover R' R. 2L. R. Ch. Ap.212.
(b)Metropolitan Trust Co.v. Tonawanda Valley etc. R. R. Co.
103 N. Y. 245.
(c)Laws of New York, I885, ch. 376.
the united States courts have done and thus redered the
statutes unnecessary.
/ V/'is,/ '!/ " '"'/ , / /-/ 7, ,..
WHY TI-E COURTS EXERCISE THIS POVER.
j J,'i4L/_./. j.'W ! J 'J W' .J'J. 2L,/4r'/ J ..Ji
The reason for the exercise of this power by courts
of equity is thus stated by Justice Blatchford in Union
Trust Co. v. Illinois 4 dland Co. 117 U. S. on page 455:
"Property subject to liens and claims and debts, of var-
ious characters and ranks, which is brought within the
cognizance of a court of equity for administration, ia a
trust fund. It is to be preserved for those entitled to it.
This must be done by the hands of the court through of-
ficers. The character of the property gives character
to the particular speciesof preservation which it requires.
Unimprofed property land may lie idle, with only payment
of taxes. Improved property should be rented. Movable
property which is not perishable may be locked up and
kept; but if perishable, it must be sold by way of pres-
ervation. A railroad and its appurtenances are a peculiar
species of property. Not only will its structures deter-
iorate and decay and perish if not cared for and kept up,
but its business and goodwill will pass away, if it is
not run and kept in good order. Moreover, a railroad is a
matter of public concern. The franchises and rights of
the corporation which constructed it, were given not
merely for private gain to the corporation, but to furn-
ish a public highway; and all parsons who deal ,ith the
corporation as ascreditors or holaers of its obligations,
must necessarily be held to do so in the view, that, if
it falls into insolvency and its affairs come into a court
of equity for adjustment, involving the transfer of its
franchises and property, by a sale into other hands, to
have the purposesof its creation still carried out, the
court, while in charge of the property, has the power,
and, under some circumstances, it may be its duty, to
make such repairs as are necessary to keep the road and its
structures in a safe and proprr condition to serve the
public. Its power to do this does not depend on consent
or on prior notice . Consent is desirable, but is seldom
practicable, whwre the debts exceed the value of the prop-
ert,."
THLE BOI DHOLDERS ARE EXTITLEiD TO YWAT?
A 1 /, V, // / 7 , / V_1
The mortgage bondholdei-s are only entitled to the
net income of the railroad to pay their debt and interest
before the mortgage is foreclosed. When railroad property
is in the hands of a receiver he has full authority to
use all the income to pay the necessary running expenses,
if it is neededI.He can take the surplus of the income
over the running expenses to make repairs, buy rolling
stock, etc., when it is for t__he benefit of all parties
interested. In such cases the receiver should have an
express order of the court allowing him to do so. (a)
"Notwithstanding this, if the company be not declared
insolvent, or if no application be made in its behalf for
the assistance of a court of equity, the persons holding
the claims for labor and n-ecessa~y suppliesand materials
have no position superior to any general creditor. They
have no lien or claim upon the eurnings, and if they seek
payment, and it be refused, they are put to their suit at
law as an ordinary creditor. Ut if the railroad com-
pany come into or is brought into court, and it appears
(a) Fosdick v. Schall 99U. S. 252.
Hale v. Railroad Co.60 N. H. 333,34I and cases cited.
Atchins v. Petersburgh R. R. Co. 3Hughes (U.S.C.C.) D0a.
18
that within a reasonable time before this, the normal and
J
ust disposition oi its earnings has been disturbed, and
that the mottgage bondholders have received interest from
these earnings, or 1that, in part or in whole, these earn-
ings have been used for their advantage, or for that of
the stockholders, leaving laborers, material men, unpaid,
then the courts create an equity in favor of this latter
class. They follow the sums so diverted from the just
and normal mode of distribution. They order it restored,
primarily, out of such earnings as the receiver may have.
these prove deficient, the restoration is made out of the
corpus,which has been improved or made productive by the
diversion. Were it not for the diversion---this taking of
the money justly applicable to one class and using it for
the benefit od another---the equity could not exist. If
there be no earnings, or if the earnings are insufficient
to pay xpenses, and there be no permat improvements
made, and no interest whatever paid, upon no principle of
law or equity could the bondholders be made to pay out
of h4b own property the debts of a common debtor. This
would not only be a thorough disregard of the sanctity of
a contract obligation, (Kneeland v. Trust Co. 136 U. S.97),
but also would be confiscation of property. So all these
19
conditions musy concur before the equity will be applied.
The railroad company must have been kept a going concern.
The creditor must have aided with necessary material,
supplies , or equiptrnent in so keeping it a going concern.
It must have made earnings. These earnings must have been
used, in whole or in part, in the payment of interest, or
in making permanent improvements, or for the benefit in
some way If the mortage creditors or stockholders. See
Burnham v. Bowen III U. S. 781-2. When all these concur
a court of equity, which is called upon to foreclose the
mortgage or to administer the affairs of the company#,
will see to it that all earnings whi._ch may have been
diverted from their proper disposition will be restored
from tarnings in the hands of the receiver, and, these
failing, from the corpus." (a)
The above opinion is correct, but it must be read
with the cases it cites or it will be misunderstood Any
diversion, or any benefit, received by stockholders or
bondholders by action of these enumerated creditors will
give them an equity against the crpus, If needed. (b)
(a) Finance Co. v. Charleston C. & C. R. R. Co. 48 Fed.I88.
(b)Burnham v. Bowen III U. S. page 781.
NOTES ON S0ME OF THE EXTREME CASES.
/I L f,' ! I '  / , / 7'. -I fL-i' I
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Other cases go a great deal farther and it may be
laid down as a general proposition that all outlays made
by the receiver in good faith, in the ordinary course,
with a view to advance and promote the business of the
road, and to render it profitable and successful are fairly
within the limit of discretion which is necessarily al-
lowed to a receiver entrusted with the management and
operation of a railroad in his hands. His duties, and the
discretion with which he is invested are very different
from those of a passive receiver, appointed merely to
collect and hold money due on prior transactions, or rents
accruing from houses and lands. And to such outlays kxi
ordinary course, may properly referred, not onlr the keep-
ing of the road, buildings, and rilling stock in repair,
but also the providing ol such additional accommodations,
stock and instrumentalities as the necessatres of the businesj
may require, always refjerring to the court, or to the
master appointed in that behalf, for advice and authority
in any matter of importance, which may involve a consid-
erable outla- of money in lump. (a)
(a) Cowdrey v. R. R. Co. I Woods pge 336.
Gilbert v. Wa shington City etc. R. R. Co.
33 Gratt. (Va.)586, 624.
21
The princilA laid down in Wallace v. Loomis was ap-
plied in Ililtenberger v. Log ansport Railway Co. (106
U. S. 286, 311, 212.) In that case a bill was filed by
a second mortgagee against the mortgagor, and a first
mortgagee, and judgment creditors of the mortga,;er, to
foreclose a mortgage on a railroad. On the day the bill
was filed, and without notice to the first mortgagee, a
receiver was appointed, and power given him to operate
and manage the road,Wreceive its revenues, pay its operating
expenses, make repairs, and manage its entire business,
and to pay the arrears due for operating expenses for a
period in the past not exceeding ninety days, and to pay
into the court all revenues over operating expenses."
After this, and without notice to the first mortgagee, who had
not appeared, though notified ofthe order appointing the
receiver, and of the pendency of the suit, the court
authorized the receiver to purchase engines and cars,
and to adjust liens on cars owned by the mortgagor, and
to pay indebtedness, not exceeding ( IO,0OO, to other
connecting lines of roads, in settlement of ticket and
freight accounts and balances, and for materials and
repairs, which had accrued in part more than ninety days
before the order appointing the receiver was made, and
22
to construct five miles of new road, and a bridge. The
petition for the order stated the necessity for the rol-
ling stock and for the adjustment of the liens: that the
paymen of the connecting lines was indispensable to the
business of the road, and it would suffer great detriment
unless that was provided for; and that the new road and
the bridge would come under the mortgages, and that theti
construction would be to the advantage of the bondholders.
After the first mortgagee had appeared "and answered,
an order was made, but not upon prior notice to it, au-
thorizing the receiver to issue certificates to pay for
rolling stock he had bought under orders of the court,
and to pay debts incurred for building the five miles
of road and the bridge, under those orders, and to pay
debts incttrred for taxes and rights of way, and back pay
and supplies in operating the road, the certificates to
be payable out of income, and if not paid, to be provided
for by the court cin its final order. Claims thus arising
were afterwards allowed, to be paid out o the proceeds
of the sale, before the mortgage bonds, and the United
States Supreme Court sustained the decision.
Shaw v. The RailroaI Co. (0) I. S. .65) holds a
careful consideration by the coarts is necessary befor- they
grant petitions asking for the appoint-rment of receivers of'
railroads and that receivers should. not be appointed to managa
a railroad if an- otlie . arran, _-ement can 'e made.
Nneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co. (1 36 U. S.) 89)
holds the appointment of a receiver of a railroad vests in
the court no absolute control of the property, and no
gen-eral authority to displu: ce vested.jliens, and when a
court iake-s sucl. an appointment it has i' ri .t to imake
ti e receivership conditional on the panrment of any -unse-
cureo claims, excep tilo few wieCh by the r-ulins Of tie
United States Supreme Court have been declared to have an
equitable priority; it being the exception and not ta e
rule that the con-tract priordity of liens can be displaced.
In this case there was a first mortgage on the r__ -bed
and real property of the railroad and also a first ieort -
age on the roll.ong-stock. udgieat creditor haJ a re-
ceiver appointed of the enTtire property to see if the
judgment creditor could not obtailn payment from surplus
income. The income sailed to pay running expenses and
interest on the Thortga as. en the mortgagee of the
real prop0erty took proceedings to fore(_Iosc iis mortga--0
and had a receiver ap ointed to te cI,.a' ,-o of alJ te
railroad proporty-, and manage it. The imortgaE'ee of the
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rolling stock, at the distribution of the proceeds from
the sale of the real property, wished to be paid all the
deficit which had accrued to him through both receiver-
ships from the smallness of the income of the road. The
court allowed the claim for the second receivership, but
not the first. In the first case the mbrtgage_.e of the
real pro--perty had suffered equally with the mortgagee of
the rolling stock, but in the second case his application
to the court to take the rolling stock and use it for his
benefit made it equitable that he should pay for the use
of the property during that time.
This extraordinary jurisdiction of a court of equity
is n--ot confired to railroads, but extends to anything
which is of public concern 4*#is necessary to exercise
this jurisdiction in order to prevent a failure of jus-
tice.
4
Jerome v. I'Oarter, A~ 94 U. S. 734.
ir
CRITICISM OF THIS POWER.
There has been a great deal of criticism uttered on
this extraordinary jurisdiction of a court of equity.
The late Judge Baxter, of th. United States Circuit Court,
for the Sixth Circuit, in the unsavory Pease Receiver
J1
Case, and elsewhere, is reported tp have expressed himself
strongly against the practise of issueing receiver's
certificates. Se: II Chicago Legal Hews, 8, where a case is
cited of a Georgia railroad which cost 'iI5,000,000;
the receiver in three years issued certificates to the
amount of $I,500,000, and upon a sale "the road did
not bring enough to redeem the certificates! In another
case, in Michigan, when a road which had cost ,8,000,000,
came to be sold at the termination of a receiveriSip,
the counsel asked the court to fix the minimum price, so
that enough might be secured to pay the receiver and his
counsel!! Ibid.
"Whilst under the care of a court of equity, property
r.Qjbe preserved in statu quo as nearly as possible; that ia
is an actual necessity, and it is fair to infer that all the
parties interested gave an implied assent in advance to
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the use of the means necessar, to that end. To feed live-
stock; to prevent a house from falling down or burning
up; to stop the leaks in a ship to prevent its sinking;
t iese acts, and otliers like them, are of such actual
indispensable necessity that every mind at once assents
to their performance. Their omission would amount to
21ross negligence, sufficient to make the bailee respon-
sible; and the idea of discretion could scarcely enter
into consideration. But when you go beyond this, and
invoke the interposition of discretionary powers, you pass
into a veritable dreamland. Alas for the day when the
owner's right and title to property can be subjected to the
discretion of any court, and when a constitutional pro-
vision can be made subject to the idea of an undefined
necessity! It has been s.id that you cannot measure a
live snake; THAT is quite as easy a task as to measure
C
the neeessities of a railroad for m~ney, when in the
hands of a receiver. If anything beyond such acts of
necessity as are enumerated above should require the
outlay of money, it is far more consistent with the prin-
ciTles of our Constitution and laws, and with the rights
of the parties, to call a meeting of those interested,
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to obtain their consent to the expenditures, than to make
unauthorized appropriations, through the exercise of dis-
cretion, upon the idea of improvement to the property."
Alex. I. Clayton, 13 American Law Review4I.
"Now, nothing is clearer than that this impairs the
obligation of contracts between mottgagors and. mortgagees.
What the State cannot do, and what the Federal government
must not do, a Court of Chancery ought to hesitate to do.
It cannot be seriously questioned that the exercise of this
power by the court impairs, quoad hoc,the obligation of
the mortgage contract, and in practise it is notorious
that it frequently diverts a lay-g<o portion of the mortgage
security. It is little siort of m~nstrous that a court
of chancery should assume the exercise of s.ch M-poier,
and unless the courts themselves recede from the position
lately taken upon this question, and abandon the pernic-
ious practice of authorizing receiver'S certificates for
any other purpose than to preserve the property from
destruction, or to protect the public in the use of the
hig.way, and o making such certificates a lien prior to
the mortgage liens, except by the unanimous and express
personal assent of the bondholders, the legislature must
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be invoked, and we shall present .o the eye of the world
the unseemly spectacle of legislatures--- such as we have
in this country--- enacting statutes to prevent pl-nder
and the impairment of contracts by the Courts of Chancery!"
Charles Fiske Beach, Jr. , Law Quarterly Review 439.
In Credit Co. of London v. Arkansas Central R. R. Co.
15 Fed.Rep. 49, Judge Caldwell said : "In the case of Paine
v. little Rock & Ft. Smith R. R. Co. , April term, 1874,
application was made to this court to authorize a rceiver
to issue certificates, which were to be a.kien, to build
sixty miles of road,, in order to earn a large and val-
uable land grant, which would lapse in a short time unless
the road was completed. A majority in value of the first
mortgage bondholders concurred in the application; and the
orders of the court in th- case of Stanton v. Alabama &
Chattanooga R. R. Co. and the case of Kennedy v. St. Paul
and Pacific R. R. Co. were pressed upon the attention of
the court. But the order was refused, upon the ground
that it was no part of the duty of a court of chancery
to build railroads, and that the assent of all the parties
interested in the property could not make it suck. And
there is no difference, so far as relates to this question;
between building a railroad and making extensive and gun-
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repairs and betterments, the cost of whicv sometimes
approximates the cost of original construction. In the
case referred to, of the F'rt Smith railway, the proceedings
to foreclose were speeded and L decree rende Jd to meet
the exigencies of the case, which the Supreme Court ap-
proved, (a) and said 'was a more desirable plan' than to
issue receiver's certificates."
(a) Shaw v. Railroad Co. 100 U. S. 612.
PRAISE FOR THE ACTION OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY.
In striking contrast to the above criticism is the
opiion of Justice Brewer, of the United States Supreme
Court, delivered in Circuit Court, District of Nebraska,
on July 27, 1891, and reported in 47 Federal Reporter
on page 26. He says: "I know, to one who is only familiar
with the narrow limits and the strict lines within and
along which courts of law proceed, the act of a court of
equity in taking possossion of a contract running for
999 years, and decreeing its specific performance through
all those years, seems a strange exercise of power; but I
believe most thoroughly that the powers of a court of
equity are as vast, and its processes and procedure as
elastic, as all the changing emergencies of increasing
complex business relations and the protection of rights
can demand. And, in passing, I may be permitted to ob-
serve that in this(i 4.&e- respect the distinguished jurist
(Judge Dillon) who appearsfor the defendants in this case,
taught me my lesson; who, on the bench of the circuit
court of this circuit, not only took possession of and
managed great railroad companies by receivers, but built
hundreds of miles of railroad, and created mi1jions of
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dollars of obligations against those roads. I then watched
those proceedings with something of amazement, but the more
I studied, the more I admired, till, thus having studied
at the feet of Gamaliel, I learned to believe that the
and processes
powers A of a court of equity are equal to any and every
emergency. They are potent to protect the humbles. indi-
vidual from the oppression of the mightiest corporation;
to protiect every corporation from the destroying greed
of the public; to stop state or nation from spoliating
or destroying privare rights; to grasp with strong hand
every corporation, and compel it to perform its contracts
of every nature, and do justice to every individual.
"May 1 be permitted another sj gestion: The railroad
world of to-day is in unrest. Millions of capital have
gone into railroad enterprises, seeking profit therefrom,
Legislators vie with legidlatore in efforts t6 reduce
rates. To maintain such rates as :ill secure just com-
pensation for the capital invested, railroad companie_s
enter into associations and form traffic contracts. But
such contracts seem but ropes of sand, and such associa-
tions, but gilded ifigure-heads, and not controlling
forces. And back of all id a wide and growing demand
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that the government take possession of all the railroads,
and itself become the great common carrier. Is it not
possible that tho power of a coury of equity may yet be
found adequate to the situation? that such courts ma,
yet lay strong hands upon these r,ilroad corporations,
and, by compelling performance of contracts, secure
stability, uniformity and justice to all, and thus quiet
the clamor, and avoid any necessity of governmental pos-
session and management?"
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